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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between fraud motives (leverage and dividend), opportunities (audit quality 
and free cash flow) and earnings management. A sample of 230 firm years from six industrial sectors listed on the 
main board of Bursa Malaysia for the years 2009 and 2010. The study finds that dividend, audit quality and free 
cash flow provide significant constraints to accruals earnings management. High audit fees limit accruals earnings 
management. Results are in favour of stakeholders who rely on the external audit to oversee the integrity of 
corporate financial reporting by reducing earnings management. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings manipulation is often perceived as a technique used by firm management to purposely influence 
earnings to match the desired end.  In corporate financial reporting, earnings are the most important information 
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which indicates the extent that a firm has engaged in value-added activities. Information on earnings is used in by 
different parties in their decisions on whether or not they should provide resources to the firm.  Thus, earnings are 
key elements which determine the economic value of the firm and the allocation of resources in the capital market.  
Upon realising of the significant impact of earnings on firm reported performance, the firm management would 
always attempt to manipulate reported earnings by taking advantage of effects of the accounting choices that provide 
the basis for the best possible decisions for the firm.  The management is motivated to engage in earnings 
manipulation, i.e. earnings management, in order to report high earnings and greater economic values of the firms.  
Thus, fraud and mismanagement on financial reporting may occur as a result of personal interests of managers or 
other related parties.  
Earnings management occurs with the presence of agency problem arising from the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers.  The problem is aggravated when investors and other stakeholders are not able to arrive 
at optimal decisions about a company.  The act of managing earnings by the firm distorts the economic results and 
hinders the stakeholders’ ability to make financial decisions. Pressures to manage earnings does not stem from a 
single force. Factors such as analysts’ forecasts, access to debt markets, competition, contractual obligation, a 
roaring stock market, new financial transactions, market disregard of big charges, merger attractiveness, 
management compensation, short-term focus, unrealistic plans and budgets, period-end requests from superiors, 
periods of excessive profit followed by a fear of subsequent decline, concealing unlawful transactions, personal 
bonuses, promotions, focus on team, and job retention are among the reasons that are mentioned in the literature 
(Duncan, 2001).  The debt hypothesis suggests that the larger the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio the more managers are 
expected to choose income increasing accruals. The effects of these variables on earnings management in different 
countries may be different. In the Japanese business environment this hypothesis does not hold. It is known that 
managers of larger companies in Japan are more likely to choose income-decreasing accruals (Kester, 1992; Phan 
and Yoshikawa, 1996; Pourjalali and Hansen, 1996) 
The objectives of this study are to examine the relationship between motive (leverage and dividend) and earnings 
management; and the relationship between opportunity (audit quality and free cash flow) and earnings management. 
This study will contribute to the auditing literature as previous studies in Malaysia have focused on board of 
directors, audit committee and concentrated ownership in reducing earnings management over the period of 2002-
2003 (Rashidah & Fairuzana Haneem, 2006).  Evidence from a study on 187 Malaysian IPO firms that go public 
over the period 1989-1998 shows that issue of equity normally produce poor return (Rashidah and Wan Razazila 
2005). However, there is still lack of studies on audit quality and earnings management in Malaysia. A U.S based 
study by Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998) find that clients of Non-Big 6 auditors report higher 
discretionary accruals than clients of Big 6 auditors.  Krishnan (2003) supported the statement by stating that 
specialist auditors mitigate accruals based earnings management more than non-specialist auditors and therefore, 
influence the quality of earnings.   
The focus of the study is to acquire an understanding of whether the dividend, leverage, and free cash flow could 
act as monitoring mechanisms and restrict earnings management among Malaysian public listed companies.  The 
study examines audit independence to see if motive and opportunity of earnings management significantly related to 
the practice of earnings management.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
The primary focus of this study is on discretionary-accruals earnings management.  The study examines external 
monitoring mechanisms through the role of various stakeholders such as shareholders, lenders, and auditors. This 
study investigates how motives and opportunities relate to earnings management. Five hypotheses are developed to 
test the research objectives. 
2.1. Relationship between Dividend and Earnings Management 
Dividend and firm value have been researched extensively, at least since the seminal work of Modigliani and 
Miller’s (M & M) (see, Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller and Modigliani, 1961). The implicit assumption from 
those prior studies has been that dividend announcements and dividend yield measure are relevant aspects of a 
firm’s value (Stevens and Jose, 1992; Frankfurter and Wood Jr., 2002; Docking and Koch, 2005).  
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La Porta et al. (2000a) have documented evidence that dividends were paid because minority shareholders 
pressured corporate insiders to disgorge cash. Their findings are consistent with the agency theory which suggests 
that unless profits are paid out to shareholders, the profit may be diverted by the insiders for personal use or may be 
committed to unprofitable projects that provide private benefits for the insiders. As a consequence, outside 
shareholders have a preference for dividends over retained earnings (La Porta et al. 2000a). Therefore, it can be 
argued that dividends can play an important role to address the agency problems between corporate insiders and 
outside shareholders.  
According to Rozeff (1982), dividends is generally viewed as a control device that helps reduce managerial 
discretion and such action is part of the firm’s optimal monitoring bonding package. Easterbrook (1984) and (Rozeff 
1982) suggested that higher dividends reduces agency costs through forcing management to seek for external 
financing, resulting in closer market scrutiny. Reduced agency costs are expected to lead to higher firm value. In the 
same vein, Jensen (1986) argued that dividend reduced free cash flow that managers may otherwise divert for 
personal use or to fund unprofitable projects. This evidence is consistent with the notion that dividends are paid 
when firms have excess cash flows in order to reduce potential over investment by management. It is expected that 
this theory is applicable in developing markets such as Malaysia, particularly with the implementation of recent 
reform on corporate governance. The above arguments suggest the following hypothesis.  
 
H1: Dividend payment has a negative significant relationship with earnings management. 
2.2. Relationship between Leverage and Earnings Management 
Leverage provides an incentive for firms to manage earnings as a result of adverse consequences associated with 
defaults of debt obligations. The use of external debt financing will also result in the likelihood of additional outside 
monitoring by debt providers similar to that provided by major institutional investors or external stockholders to 
protect their investment interests. As such, an increase in the level of leverage would reduce agency costs inherent in 
a firm’s operating structure (Selahudin et al., 2014). 
According to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), debt financing is often used either as an alternative or 
complementary control mechanism to reduce agency costs.  Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) outline a 
number of benefits associated with the use of debt financing with controlling agency costs. Grossman and Hart 
(1982) suggest that short term debt aligns the managerial incentive to shareholders’ incentives to avoid the costs of 
bankruptcy. They argue that financial leverage reduces agency costs with the increase in the possibility of 
bankruptcy. Grossman and Hart (1982) and Williams (1987) further argue that greater financial leverage may reduce 
agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which may result in personal losses to managers in terms of 
reductions in  salaries, reputation, perquisites, and, according to Jensen (1986), the pressure to generate cash flow to 
pay interest expenses. 
Myers (1977) explains that high level of leverage may mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers 
concerning the choice of investment. Since the debt has to be paid back in cash, the amount of free cash flow that 
could be diverted by the manager is reduced by the debt repayment. Debt thus serves as a mechanism to discipline 
corporate managers and prevent them from maximizing their private gains of lavish perquisites, plush offices, and 
‘empire building’ through sub-optimal investment decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1986). Companies that have 
high leverage may face the risk of bankruptcy if they are not able to make payments on their external debt financing.  
Hence, based on the above arguments, the hypothesis is developed as follows:  
 
H2: Leverage has a positive significant relationship with earnings management. 
2.3. Relationship between Audit Independence and Earnings Management 
Auditors play an important role to ensure the quality financial reports.  Auditing services are needed to facilitate 
dealings between the internal and external parties of a business such as shareholders, creditors, public authorities, 
employees, customers and others (Chia, Lapsley and Lee, 2007). The function of auditing is to ensure the quality of 
corporate earnings has come under considerable inquiry due to some high-profiled earnings management courses 
such as WorldCom and the collapse of Enron (Li and Lin, 2005).  
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Auditors facilitate the contract between investors and management by attesting the reliability of the financial 
statements. However, auditors’ monitoring is valuable to investors only if auditors are independent (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). DeAngelo (1981) define independence within a broader framework of audit quality. Audit 
quality is the joint probability that the auditor discovers and reports a misstatement. Auditors’ independence is 
considered compromised when auditors fail to report misstatements they have discovered. 
The provision of non-audit services can impair independence by creating an economic bond between auditos and 
clients. Simunic (1984) models the joint demand for audit and non-audit services. He defines a decrease in auditor 
independence as “any situation which alters incentives such that a self-interested auditor is more likely to ignore, 
conceal, or misrepresent his findings.” He shows that when the same auditor provides both services and retains a 
portion of the cost savings from “knowledge spillovers,” they are economically bonded to the client. Parkash and 
Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) present empirical evidence using the U.S. and U.K. data, respectively. They show 
that firms act as if the purchase of non-audit services jeopardizes independence. Both studies find that firms 
requiring high quality audits because of high agency costs.  These firms are less likely to purchases non-audit 
services from their auditor. Using U.K. data, Gore et al. (2001) obtain evidence on a positive association between 
the provision of non-audit services and earnings management. Firms that receive more non-audit services practice 
earnings management. They also document that Non-Big 5 auditors representing low audit quality allow more 
earnings management than Big 5 auditors. 
A study found that non-audit fees increase auditor-client economic bonds, leading to a decline in accruals 
quality. High audit efforts as reflected in high audit fees improve accruals quality (Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). Since 
audit fees produce more stable yearly revenue than the non-audit fees, auditor may perceive greater fee as a pressure 
from client who pays high audit fees than non-audit fees (Reynolds et al., 2004). This study will use the total audit 
fees divided by total assets of the firms to proxy audit quality. If the amount of the audit fees is too high compared to 
the size of the audited firm, there is a high probability that audit firms may impair its judgment during auditing 
process. When this thing happens, there might be high earnings management by the managers.  Hence, based on the 
above arguments, the hypothesis below is developed.  
 
H3: Audit independence has a negative significant relationship with earnings management. 
2.4. Relationship between Free Cash Flow and Earnings Management 
Jensen (1986) stated that if free cash flow in a company is not used or invested to maximize or to balance the 
best interest of shareholders, then it raises agency problems. The manager may choose to invest the cash in an 
unprofitable project due to his or her self-interest. As a result, the company may be in the position of low growth. In 
the absence of effective monitoring actions by other independent stakeholders, managers are likely to conceal the 
information on the activities by providing minimal disclosure or by manipulating accounting number. Managers 
may not provide adequate disclosure to investors on the investment cash flows or the underlying assumptions of the 
project. Based on this minimal information, investors may not be able to know the prospect and advantages or 
disadvantages of the project for their wealth (Chung et al. 2005).  This is because investors do not have access to 
inside information. 
Managers may not provide information on the internally projected cash flows of some investments. As a result of 
personal interests, managers overlook the need for preparing projected cash flow and profit forecast. The choice for 
making poor investments may reduce future earnings and lead to an act to remove directors or senior executives. In 
order to avoid the risk of facing the management turmoil, managers may employ accounting numbers to increase 
reported earnings. It is assumed that investors are completely unravelled of earning numbers. Hence, managers are 
motivated to manage earnings in order to fulfil their needs.  Based on the above arguments, the following hypothesis 
is developed as follows: 
 
H4: Free cash flow has a positive relationship with earnings management.  
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3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Sample and data collection.  
The sample comprises 230 firms listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia in 2009 and 2010. The sample is 
drawn from six industrial sectors, industrial product, consumer product, trading and services, plantation, properties 
and construction. These sector are selected because of the homogeneity in their characteristics which enable 
comparative analysis be performed. The finance industry (bank, insurance, unit trusts and finance firms) is excluded 
because it has different regulatory requirements which are expected to affect the abnormal accruals and audit fees 
(Srinidhi, 2007). Data on companies were collected from the Thomson DataStream and Thompson One Banker as 
well as the Bursa Malaysia website. 
3.2. Research Design 
This study uses the Kothari et al. (2005) model to detect earnings management and to improve the performance 
measures in the accruals regression. Cooper and Schindler (2008) define earnings management as a variable that is 
measured, predicted or otherwise monitored by the researcher and expected to be affected by a manipulation of the 
independent variables. Independent variables represent values being manipulated that influence the dependent 
variable (Cooper and Schindler, 2008). Independent variables in this current study are dividend, leverage, audit 
independence and free cash flow. The control variables are profitability and size of firm. A multivariate model was 
developed to test the research hypotheses.  
 
a) Total accruals (TA) is estimated in order to determine the amount of discretionary accruals. Kothari et al. 
(2005) estimated total accruals as below: 
 
TAit  =  [(∆ non-cash current assetit ) - (∆ current liabilitiesit excluding the  current portion of long 
term debt) - (Depreciation and amortizationit)] / total assets it-1. 
 
The following model captures the components of total accruals and non-discretionary accruals. 
 
 
 
 
 
Where:  
TAit   - Total accruals of firm i in year t.  
ASSETS(it – 1)  - Total assets of firm i at the end of year t -1. 
∆ SALESit - Sales change in net of the change of account receivable of firm i between years t 
and t – 1.  
PPEit - Level of gross property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t 
ROAit (or it -1) - ROA of firm i at the end of year t (or ROA of firm i at the end of year t – 1) 
 
The non-discretionary accruals component of this model which incorporates changes in sales and changes in 
property, plant and equipment are scaled by lagged total assets. In calculating discretionary accruals which 
represents earnings management, the Kothari et al. (2005) model includes the current or lagged years of ROA. This 
model will include the ROA it or ROA it - 1, which stand for ROA current year and last year as to control the firm’s 
performance. This model has included ROA to compare the effectiveness of performance matching versus 
regression based approach (Kotharis’ et al, 2005).  
 
 
 
TAit  =  δ΋  + δΌ  (1 / ASSETS(it – 1) ) + δ΍  ∆ SALESit + δΎ  PPEit +  
         δΏ  ROAit (orit -1) + νit 
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ROAit 
 
= 
 
Net Incomeit 
 
or 
 
ROA(it -1) 
 
= 
 
Net Income(it – 1) 
Total Assetsit Total Assetsit 
 
 
b) The following regression model is employed to examine the relationship between earnings management and 
independent variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
DA  - Absolute performance adjusted discretionary accruals (earnings management) 
 LEV  - Leverage; debt to total assets 
LogAFEE - Audit fees 
 LogNAFEE - Non-audit fees 
 Log FCF - Free cash flow 
DYLD  -      Dividend yield 
 ROE  - Return on equity 
LogTA  - Total assets 
 
c) Free cash flow is cash directly available to the company security holders (shareholders for both common 
and preferred shares) and debt holders.  Free cash flow is measured by operating income before 
depreciation minus expenses such as tax expense, interest expense, and dividend (Lehn & Poulsen, 1989). 
The free cash flow model is defined as Ct = Free cash flow expected date t 
 
Whereby, Ct = EBIT – taxes + dep. amort + (∆fixed assets + inc.def) – working capital investment 
Where: 
EBIT   - Earnings before interest and taxes 
  Taxes  - Taxes on operating income (EBIT x ͲǤ͵Ͷଶ) 
Dep. amort - Depreciation and amortization 
∆fixed assets - Change in fixed assets (purchase of fixed assets) 
inc. def  - Increase of deferred charges (if any) 
 
Working capital investments = Changes of working capital; 
Working capital = (inventories + accounts receivable from customers – accounts payable 
to suppliers) x (sales/365). 
4. Results  
Table 1 presents results of regression analysis on relationships between earnings management (discretionary 
accruals) and independent variable for the period covering 2009 to 2010 (pooled data) and for each individual year 
of 2009 and 2010.  Data for different years are separately analysed and presented in Table 4.2(a) and Table 4.2(b). 
Using regression model, this study mainly regresses the variables with the absolute performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals.  The Mahalanobis’ distance is used to detect outliers.  
 
 
 
 
 
DAіt =   λΌ  + λ΍  ( LEV)it + λΎ  (LogNAFEE) + λΏ  (LogAFEE)it +   λ5 (LogFCF)it   +     
               λ6 (DYLD)it + λ7 (ROE)it + λ8 (LogTA)(it + ε it) 
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Table 1. Results of regression analyses on Earnings Management for the year of 2009 and 2010 (pooled data)  
  Unstandardized Coefficients   Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
  B 
Std. 
Error Beta     
(Constant) .142 .065  2.181 .030 
Leverage .023 .030 .058 .764 .446 
LogAud Fee .003 .008 .037 .342 .733 
LogNonAudFee .001 .001 .053 .698 .486 
Log FreeCashFlow -.002 .001 -.127 -1.798 .074** 
DYLD -.001 .001 -.054 -.755 .451 
Log TotAsset -.008 .005 -.182 -1.689 .093** 
ROE .000 .000 -.060 -.818 .414 
R2 .056     
Adjusted R2 .018     
F-Statistic 2.994        
***Significant at the 0.001 level (Sig 2-tailed) **Significant at the 0.05 level (Sig 2 –tailed) *Significant at the 0.1 level (Sig 2 – tailed) 
 
Based on pooled data for the year 2009 and 2010, results indicate two variables, log free cash flow and log total 
asset, have negative significant relationships with earnings management.  See Table 4.1 for details.  Results support 
hypothesis 4 which states managers are more likely to manage earnings when the surplus of free cash flow is high.  
Other independent variables did not show any significant relationship with earnings management. Thus, except for 
one hypothesis discussed above none for the four hypotheses developed in section 3 is supported.  
For the control variables, log total asset shows significant relationship with earnings management. The result is 
consistent with Short and Keasey (1999) who reported that firm size has a positive significant effect on 
performance. The result suggests that larger firms have the potential of an easy access to funds, both internally and 
externally. The adjusted R2 for the absolute discretionary accruals for the data is 1.8 percent. The adjusted R2 is 
acceptable and consistent with Aini et al. (2006) which indicated a range between 1 to 6 percent.  Becker et al. 
(1998) show an adjusted R2 of 1 percent. Chang and Sun (2009) also find a small value of R2 of 0.7 to 7.4 percent.  
4.1. Additional Regression Analysis 
This study performs additional tests of the hypotheses using separate data set from 2009 and 2010.  The 
objective is to see whether results for the two years differ.  Results reveal the value of R2 i.e., .117 in 2010 is higher 
than that of .095 in 2009.  The result indicates that the 2010 model has better explanation on changes in earnings 
management compared to the 2009 model.  In 2010, the model explains 11.7 percent of the discretionary accruals 
variance, the proxy for earnings management.  In 2009, the model explains only 9.5 percent of the variance. The F 
value of 1.793 is reported significant at p=0.097 for the 2010 model indicate the model is more fit than model in 
year 2009 with a lower F value of only 1.422. 
 
Table 2. Results of regression analysis on Earning Management for the year 2009 and 2010 
 Model 1 (2009) Model 2 (2010) 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
(Constant)  .300 .765  2.499 .014 
Leverage .140 1.342 .183 -.030 -.269 .788 
LogAud Fee .191 1.215 .227 -.032 -.210 .834 
LogNonAudFee .086 .811 .419 .075 .693 .490 
Log FreeCashFlow -.222 -2.084 .040* -.114 -1.159 .250 
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DYLD .137 1.318 .191 -.256 -2.573 .012* 
Log TotAsset -.237 -1.522 .131 -.196 -1.296 .198 
ROE -.034 -.320 .750 -.089 -.798 .427 
R2 .095   .117   
Adjusted R2 .028   .052   
F-Statistic 1.422   1.793   
***Significant at the 0.001 level (Sig 2 - tailed)**Significant at the 0.01 (Sig 2 –tailed)*Significant at 0.05 level (Sig 2 – tailed) 
 
The study provides evidence on the significant positive relationship at p=0.012 between dividend with 
discretionary accruals representing earnings management. The result indicates that dividend payment increases 
earnings management. In conclusion, dividend significantly affects earnings management in 2010. Based on 2010 
model, hypothesis 1 is supported.  
With respect to free cash flow, the result in 2009 reports a significant negative relationship with earnings 
management at p=0.040.  Thus, hypothesis 4 is supported.  Results show firms with higher free cash flow tend to 
have higher earnings management. This result supports the Jensen (1986) argument that the allocation of free cash 
flow is an important aspect of the basic conflict of interest between managers and owners.  However, the significant 
negative relationship between log free cash flow and earnings management is not found in 2010. Thus, the result on 
the relationships between variables for the 2010 model rejects hypothesis 4 which indicates that free cash flow may 
not lead to higher earnings management. The study also found that, the other independent variables, i.e., leverage 
audit quality, do not show significant relationships with earnings management. Therefore, hypotheses 2 and 3 are 
rejected. 
 
Table 3. Results of regression analysis on Earnings Management for the year 2009 and 2010 (Exclude firm without non-audit fees) 
 
 All 2009 2010 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
(Constant)  2.146 .034  .849 .399  1.867 .066 
Leverage .101 1.198 .233 .169 1.382 .172 .022 .190 .850 
LogAud Fee -.041 -.341 .734 .093 .505 .615 -.084 -.509 .612 
LogNonAudFee .144 1.541 .126 -.056 -.385 .701 .290 2.324 .023** 
Log FreeCashFlow -.182 -2.278 .024** -.231 -1.841 .070** -.177 -1.643 .105 
DYLD -.061 -.729 .467 .071 .576 .567 -.167 -1.398 .167 
Log TotAsset -.177 -1.475 .142 -.151 -.825 .412 -.239 -1.461 .148 
ROE -.081 -.963 .337 -.107 -.799 .427 -.132 -1.056 .294 
R2 .101   .106   .215   
Adjusted R2 .058   .016   .136   
F-Statistic 2.365   1.171   2.735   
***Significant at the 0.001 level (Sig 2 - tailed)**Significant at the 0.01 (Sig 2 –tailed) *Significant at 0.05 level (Sig 2 – tailed) 
 
As an additional analysis, data on firms without non-audit fees of different years (i.e., 2009, 2010) and the 
pooled data) are separately examined.   The objective of this analysis is to see whether results of the different years 
are not similar. Results of the analysis are expected to enhance the explanation on the variance in earnings 
management by the independent variable.  Results show that the model in 2010 explains for 21.5 percent of the 
variance in discretionary accruals which is a proxy for earnings management.  The F value for the year 2010 is 2.735 
and is reported significant at p= 0.014.  For the data of 2009, the analysis shows that the model explains only 10.6 
percent of the variance in earnings management with F value of 1.171.  For all year data, the model explains only 
about 10.1 percent of variance of discretionary accruals.  Results indicate that the 2010 model is more fit than model 
in year 2009 or all years.     
As reported in Table 3, non-audit fees are significantly and positively related to the earnings management at 
p=0.023 significant level. Therefore, the hypothesis 3(b) is supported. This result is consistent with the Gore et al 
(2009) study which found that audit independence has a positive relationship with the level of earnings 
134   Nurul Fitri Mohd Noor et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  28 ( 2015 )  126 – 135 
management. Blomfield and Shockman (2008) provide full support on the impairment of auditors’ independence 
arising from the provision of non-audit services to client and the relationship with clients.  Consequently, auditors 
are less likely to report any wrongdoing that might lead to earnings management or corporate fraud. For log free 
cash flow, the result in 2009 report is significant at p=0.070 and it support Hypothesis 4. This study provides the 
evidence that the firm with high free cash flow would have higher probabilities of earnings management. This 
research consistent with study by Jensen (1986) found that the allocation of free cash flow is an important aspect of 
the basic conflict of interest between managers and owners. For the year 2010, log free cash flow insignificant with 
earnings management. Therefore, based on the relationship for year 2010, hypothesis 4 is rejected. The result 
indicates that free cash flow may not influence higher earnings management. Indeed, the study also found that, the 
other independent variables negatively show significant relationship with earnings management. Here, Hypothesis 1 
(Dividend and EM) Hypothesis 2 (Leverage and EM) and Hypothesis 3(a) (Audit fees and EM) are rejected in the 
study. 
5. Conclusion 
Results of this study are expected to enhance the understanding on factors that motivate earnings management in 
the Malaysian context. Results show that the existence of surplus fee cash flow provides an opportunity to managers 
involved themselves in earnings management.  Managers may manipulate earnings for their own personal benefits.  
The study finds dividend payment significantly related to earnings management in year 2010. Thus, the first 
hypothesis is rejected. For second hypothesis, leverage shows a significant negative relationship with earnings 
management in year 2009 and 2010. It indicates that high debt firms would increase the opportunities for managers 
to involve in earnings management. This finding is inconsistent with Beatty and Weber (2003), Dichev and Skinner 
(2002), Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) who find that firms with high leverage engage in 
earnings management to avoid debt covenant by financial institutions. The audit independence measurements which 
are audit fees and non-audit fees in the hypothesis 3(a) and 3(b) show insignificant results with earnings 
management for hypothesis 3(a) but positive significant for hypothesis 3(b).  
Although the study is limited in the data collection, future studies may include other opportunities and control 
mechanism variables that may influence earnings management. In particular, the enforcement of certain regulations 
and standards, such as the establishment of Audit Oversight Board and the revised of Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance may strengthen the existing governance practices and enhance the quality of financial reporting.   
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